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A Spanish reform granted regions the authority to set income tax rates, resulting
in substantial tax differentials. Using administrative data, conditional on moving,
taxes have a significant effect on location choice. A one percent increase in the
net-of-tax rate for a region relative to others increases the probability of moving to
that region by 1.7 percentage points. We estimate an elasticity of the number of
top taxpayers with respect to net-of-tax rates of 0.85. The mechanical increase in
tax revenue due to higher tax rates is larger than the loss in tax revenue from the
net out-flow of migration. JEL: H24, H31, H73, J61, R23
High-income taxpayers may be literally “worth their weight in gold” (Wildasin 2009) to
the government where they reside. As a means of tax avoidance, individuals may move
in response to tax differentials resulting from residence based local income taxes. Tax
avoidance typically arises when taxable income can be shifted in a way that it becomes
subject to a favorable tax treatment (Piketty and Saez 2013), and mobile taxpayers might
simply relocate their tax residence to reduce their income tax burden. As a result of tax
induced mobility by high-income taxpayers, governments may be unable to engage in
progressive redistribution (Epple and Romer 1991; Feldstein and Wrobel 1998) and tax
competition may intensify (Wildasin 2006). Despite the policy importance of analyzing
taxation in an open economy, most studies have analyzed avoidance responses of taxable
income (Feldstein 1999) although a literature on tax-induced mobility has emerged.
We provide evidence on migration resulting from a major Spanish tax reform and
fiscal decentralization. In the early 2000s, all Autonomous Communities (regions or
states) in Spain had the same top marginal tax rate. In 2011, Spanish regions began
changing their top marginal tax rates (MTR) in response to a reform that gave regions
the authority to adjust rates and the corresponding tax brackets. In 2014, top marginal
tax rates diverged across regions by as much as 4.5 percentage points. For an individual
earning 300,000 Euros, this amounts to a tax differential of 10,000 Euros. These dispari-
ties in regional top tax rates led the popular press to dub low-tax regions such as Madrid
as “tax havens” or one of several “paradises on Earth.”
Research on migration requires linked data of individuals in the country of origin
and destination, which is fairly complicated to obtain.1 Exploiting sub-national varia-
tion is therefore an appealing alternative. However, personal income in most countries is
taxed at the central level of government and only a few countries tax personal income at
the regional or local level (i.e., United States, Canada – Milligan and Smart (2016), Swe-
1Kleven, Landais and Saez (2013) and Akcigit, Baslandze and Stantcheva (2016) are
exceptions. They focus on selected sub-groups of the population for which access to
individual income data linked across countries is not needed. Bakija and Slemrod (2004),
Moretti and Wilson (2017) and Young et al. (2016) are state level examples.
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den, Italy, Switzerland – Mart́ınez (2016)). Given the expected mobility and avoidance
responses, some of these countries only allow for small differentials across jurisdictions
by limiting the tax-setting power of state and local governments. In countries with more
substantial autonomy, regional personal income taxes have been implemented decades
ago and large administrative data are not available for time periods before their imple-
mentation. Further, in the U.S., income taxes are often employment-based rather than
residence-based, which means that for local moves, individuals may change jobs rather
than residence to reduce taxes (Agrawal and Hoyt 2018).2 The reform in Spain granted
substantial autonomy to the regions on a purely residence-based tax system. Tax ad-
ministration remains with the national authorities which facilitates access to individual
micro-data that is available before and after the decentralization.
We use individual Social Security data for a sample of the population of Spain
(excluding Navarre and Basque Country, which are not included in the data) from 2005
to 2014 to study the migration decisions of the rich in response to this unique fiscal
decentralization. Our paper makes several contributions. First, we focus on all high
income individuals rather than a select group of highly mobile individuals such as star
scientists (Moretti and Wilson 2017; Akcigit, Baslandze and Stantcheva 2016), athletes
(Kleven, Landais and Saez 2013), or foreigners subject to preferential taxation (Kleven
et al. 2014; Schmidheiny and Slotwinski 2018). In terms of the scope of the sample, Young
et al. (2016) are the closest to our paper and utilize population level U.S. tax return data
for all millionaires in the United States over a thirteen year period. Exploiting state-to-
state migration of millionaires and an empirical design comparing millionaire populations
at state borders, Young et al. (2016) concludes that although taxes matter, it is with only
very small economic significance.3 Second, we study migration using a random sample
2Approximately 75 million people live in MSAs that cross state borders. Of these,
two-thirds live in MSAs that have an employment-based component to income taxes.
3We make several contributions relative to Young et al. (2016). First, we study migra-
tion patterns of the rich (above 90,000 Euros) and not just the very rich (millionaires).
We also study migration in a setting where regional taxes are purely residence-based;
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of population level administrative data for a complete panel of all regions in a country;
Young et al. (2016) have similar data and a single state analysis includes Young and
Varner (2011). This administrative data provides us detailed information on industry
and occupation that allows us to determine the generalizability of the prior literature
focusing on specific occupations. We find significant effects of taxes on location choices,
but an elasticity of the number of top taxpayers that is less than unity. We then contribute
to the literature by using a theoretical model of revenues to simulate the implications for
the fiscal authorities.
Discussion of taxing top incomes comes within the context of widening income
inequality. One discussed policy response to widening inequality is changing top tax rates.
Bonhomme and Hospido (2017) document that earnings inequality in Spain declined from
about 1995 to 2007, but that it has risen dramatically since 2007 and is back to its
1995 level. Studying mobility in Spain is especially important given the implications for
redistributive tax policy. The mobility response – especially of high income taxpayers
– is critical to understanding whether increasing progressivity at the regional level is a
viable policy response to increasing inequality. Mobility in response to more progressive
tax policy could threaten the ability to engage in redistribution given that the optimal
degree of redistribution will decline as the mobility elasticity increases (Mirrlees 1982).
The paper proceeds as follows: we use a 4% random sample of administrative
data that is released publicly to study tax-induced mobility. We use individual Social
Security and tax administration data that contains information on each taxpayer’s income
that is not top coded. These data also contain information on the taxpayers declared
location of residence in addition to certain characteristics reported to the Social Security
administration. These data do not contain tax rates, so we write our own tax calculator
from regional tax codes that simulates average and marginal tax rates back to 2005.
We first conduct an aggregated region pair analysis. We calculate for each year
in our data, the stock of top-taxpayers for every region pair combination in Spain and
in the United States, taxes may have a residence and employment-based component.
Finally, we show heterogeneous effects by industry and occupation.
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construct the log ratio of the stocks across pairs; in addition, we calculate the net-of-tax
rate differential between each of the region pairs. We then show that higher individual
income taxes reduce the stock of top-taxpayers after accounting for destination fixed
effects, origin fixed effects, and year fixed effects. The stock elasticity is approximately
0.85. Tax policy is not set randomly and any state-specific unobservable that is correlated
with taxes and migration may threaten our results. To deal with this, we show that
migration effects follow tax changes and do not pre-date them such that there are no
pre-trends in the periods prior to the reform. We also show a placebo test: pre-reform
population stock changes show no correlation with post-reform tax differential changes.
Then, we turn to an individual level analysis that studies whether individuals are
more likely to select low-tax regions, conditional on moving. Our empirical choice model
exploits individual variation in tax rates across the fifteen Spanish regions; given we
exploit person-specific tax rates, our model allows us to account for region by year fixed
effects and individual characteristics that are allowed to vary by region in order to capture
counterfactual wages in alternative regions. This approach has the advantage of allowing
us to account for fixed characteristics of the mover that are constant across alternative
regions, any sorting based on characteristics, as well as for other policy changes that
affect all individuals in the top of the income distribution. A one percent increase in
the net-of-tax rate for a region relative to others increases the probability of moving to
that region by 1.7 percentage points. Although many things may matter for decisions
on where to move, taxes appear to be important. These estimates suggest that the 0.75
percentage point average tax rate (ATR) differential between Madrid and Cataluña in
2013 increases the probability of moving to Madrid by 2.25 percentage points.
We then exploit the administrative data on occupation and industry to show that
taxes play a stronger role for certain occupations and industries. Testing for hetero-
geneity across occupation and industry helps to inform the recent policy debate on the
efficiency of tax schemes for top earners in specific occupations and industries. Several
OECD countries have preferential tax schemes for foreigners in high-income occupations.
We can shed light on the efficiency of these tax schemes. First, we replicate the result
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in the prior literature for scientists and find that those in the “professional/scientific”
and “health” industry have large and significant migration effects; entertainers including
athletes have insignificant effects, likely due to sample size. Then, we look at other oc-
cupations and industries to determine if the estimates for the occupations studied in the
prior literature generalize. Our results indicate that self-employed (a self-employed indi-
vidual will only have income in the data for formal contracts with registered firms) and
“higher-ability” occupations are more sensitive to taxes. Our industry-level data demon-
strates substantial heterogeneity with the largest effects emerging in health, finance, real
estate, and information, in addition to the scientific industries studied previously.
Our analysis comes with a caveat: our data do not allow us to disentangle a real
move from a fraudulent move where the taxpayer changes residence to a second home
without actually changing where they spend the majority of the tax year. In so much
as this is possible, the presence of such evasion implies that mobility includes both real
responses as well as tax evasion responses. From a tax revenue perspective, it does
not matter if the move is a real response or simple misreporting; from a labor supply
perspective, real moves may be more important.
As noted in Saez, Slemrod and Giertz (2012), absent both classic and fiscal ex-
ternalities, the elasticity of taxable income (ETI) suggests that the revenue maximizing
tax rate on top incomes may be as high as 80% with a broad income tax base. However,
changes resulting from mobility across regions are not generally captured in these esti-
mates and therefore understanding mobility has important implications for understanding
the optimal top income tax rate. In order to interpret the elasticities that we estimate,
we simulate a revenue maximization model incorporating migration. The model suggests
that the effect of changes in taxes on revenue can be decomposed into a mechanical (tax
rate) effect from higher taxes, a behavioral effect from changes in taxable income, and a
migration effect. The last effect depends on the stock elasticity of migration. Using our
stock elasticities, we find the mechanical effect dominates the other effects for all regions
in Spain, which has important implications for how much additional revenue a region
can raise [lose] by raising [lowering] its top tax rates. For the region of Madrid, its lower
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rate relative to the central government’s tax rate in 2014 results in revenue falling by 50
million Euro due to the mechanical effect of the lower tax rate. Using our mobility esti-
mates, migration effects only contribute 9 million Euro more in revenue. For behavioral
responses to offset the mechanical effect net of mobility effects, the elasticity of taxable
income would need to be 1.40, which is well above reasonable estimates of it. We conclude
that, in the short-run, migration does not pose a large threat to redistributive taxation.
1 Institutional Details
Spain consists of 17 autonomous communities (in Spanish: comunidades autónomas)
which are comparable to states or regions in other countries. The autonomous commu-
nities are governed according to the Spanish constitution. Furthermore, the individual
competences which each region assumes are regulated by a region specific organic law,
known as Statute of Autonomy. Important for our purpose is that taxes are due at the
place of residence (residencia habitual), which is declared in the local municipality of
residence. Since 1994, the regions receive a share of the Personal Income Tax (Impuesto
sobre la Renta de las Personas F́ısicas) as part of their revenues, but it was only in
1997 that partial autonomy over marginal tax rates was delegated to the regions (see
Durán and Esteller 2005). Initial regional autonomy was quite limited as regional level
marginal tax rates applied only to 15% of the tax base and thus autonomous communities
had little interest in changing marginal tax rates. Instead, they focused on setting tax
credits, mostly for housing and renting as well as some personal circumstances such as
ascendants and decedents.4 In 2007, following some reforms, the regional-level individual
tax rates still had to complement the common tax brackets set by the central level, but
they were applied to a larger share (35%) of their residents tax base. Therefore, in 2007,
Madrid was the first autonomous community which changed marginal tax rates, followed
by La Rioja and Valencia in 2008. These regions implemented top marginal tax rates
which were slightly lower (less than 0.1 percentage point) than the tax schedule of the
central government. Murcia followed in 2009, but returned to the common central scheme
4Tax credits predominantly lower the effective tax burden for the poor, as many fade
out with income. See the appendix for details.
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thereafter. These initial reforms resulted in very small differences in taxes across regions.
Another major wave of decentralization reforms followed this process in 2009 (last
laws approved in July 2010) but regions could not exercise their new rights until 2011.
Regions could now keep the revenues collected from half of the entire tax base in their
territory. In addition, regions were also given the right to introduce new tax brackets on
top of those implemented by the central government. In 2011, with both the ability to
construct new brackets and marginal tax rates in hand along with added incentives to
retain more of the tax revenue, several regions increased marginal tax rates substantially,
while the ones which decreased them previously lowered their rates (Bosch 2010). Another
reason for the immediate reaction of regional governments was that in 2011, the central
government raised marginal tax rates substantially and regions used this event to increase
simultaneously their own tax rates, or decrease them to counteract the national increase.
In subsequent years, some further changes in regional top tax brackets were implemented,
but the pattern of high versus low-tax regions as of 2011 generally persists.5
The regional tax changes are salient to top taxpayers. Tax forms compute an
individual’s average regional and central tax liability separately so that the individual
sees both average tax rates. When filing taxes in April, taxpayers are asked to state their
place of residence. A change of their address can be done online at the same page where
individuals submit their tax declaration and becomes effective immediately.6
In Spain, the personal income tax is a dual tax which separates the income tax base
and the capital income tax base. The reform only allowed regions to alter marginal tax
5A confounding factor could be the re-introduction of the wealth tax at the end of
2011. The decision was taken at the end of 2011, such that an immediate response in that
year – and even one in 2012 is unlikely to happen. Further, the tax has been introduced
as an explicitly temporary measure to reduce fiscal problems during the Great Recession.
Not until the end of 2012 did the government announced that the tax will also be applied
in the following year, again without establishing the tax permanently.
6We do not observe the location declared on the return. However, tax inspectors might
check any change of the fiscal residence with the data from the local register.
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rates of the labor income tax base, while the capital income tax base remained taxed under
a common tax schedule. Given that we will use Social Security data to study migration,
pure rentiers (capital income only) will be absent from the data. However, given that
these rentiers face a common national tax rate on capital income, the decentralization of
the labor income tax base is irreverent for these individuals. The reform did not affect
corporate taxes, so we do not have to worry about any correlation with corporate taxes.
1.1 Descriptive Figures of the Reforms
In 2010, all regions in our data set have tax rates that are within 0.10 percentage points
of each other. But, by 2014, substantial spatial variation had emerged. All tax rates
increased over time in levels – although some decreased relative to the central government
rate, which was changing over time. Figure 1 shows the changes for all regions and for all
brackets. In order to ease interpretation, we show the tax changes relative to what the
tax rate would be if the region had simply adopted the national tax rates in that year.
Relative to this standard, some regions decreased their tax rates while others increased
their tax rates. Immediately following the reform, top tax rates diverged by 5 percentage
points. This pattern persisted with some changes to lower bracket tax rates.
Given that many tax brackets change (not just the top ones), we need to justify
our focus on the top of the income distribution. The vertical line in figure 1 shows the
cutoff for the top 1% of income. Notice that the top 1% – incomes above 90,000 Euro
approximately — experienced the largest changes in tax rates. The tax differences for
individuals even in the top 2 to 5% were relatively small across regions – this is because
even if marginal tax rates differed across regions, average tax rates were relatively similar.
Regions that raise their tax rates by the largest amounts might be those regions
where the mobility of top earners has been declining or where the stock of top earners
is large or small. Regions had little information about how individuals would respond to
tax changes given the immediate decentralization and tax changes following the reform.
Simple correlations in appendix A.1 show that characteristics of the region related to the
top 1% seem to have small effects on the tax changes. Larger correlates with the tax
changes are political associations, debt, and income conditions.
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Although the equilibrium tax rates may be a result of a rather arbitrary political
process, this is not to say that the resulting equilibrium tax rates are as good as random.
In particular, the resulting tax rates following the policy decentralization may be a func-
tion of unobservable characteristics. While this is not something that we can rule out
entirely, we provide evidence that this does not appear to be the case. First, we do not
find pre-trends in the populations of the regions; changes in the population stocks occur
after the tax changes. Second, we show that post-reform tax rate changes do not predict
pre-reform populations or migration flows suggesting that regions do not set taxes based
on pre-reform characteristics. Of course, other unobservable changes in state policy or
state shocks may exist. While we cannot rule this possibility out with aggregate data,
we then turn to individual level data where we can control for state by year shocks.
2 Description of Data
We use panel data from 2005-2014 from Spain’s Continuous Sample of Employment Histo-
ries (Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales, MCVL). The data is provided by the Ministry
of Employment and Social Security (Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social). This ad-
ministrative data matches individual microdata from social security records with data
from the tax administration (Agencia Tributaria, AEAT), and official population register
data (Padrón Continuo) from the Spanish National Statistical Office (INE).7 The So-
cial Security administration publicly releases an approximately 4% non-stratified random
sample (over 1 million observations each year) of the population of individuals which had
any relationship with Spain’s Social Security system in a given year due to work, receiv-
ing unemployment benefits, or receiving a pension. These data have been previously in
applied work on labor and urban economics (Bonhomme and Hospido 2017; De la Roca
and Puga 2017). Individuals from Navarre and the Basque Country do not appear in
the data because these regions operate independent fiscal systems.8 If an individual is
7The tax return data often reports the location of work. Social Security data contains
residence information based off local registers.
8We exclude the individuals living there from our analysis. We treat people moving
to those two regions as people leaving the sample for any other reason (moving abroad,
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in the data, they remain in the data as long as they have contact with the Social Se-
curity ministry, but new observations enter each year so that it remains representative.
Self-employed individuals that make contact with the Social Security system do appear
in our data, however, we only observe income for them if they have a relationship with a
registered firm, as the firm remits taxes on their behalf. Self-employed individuals that
do not have contracts with firms do not appear in the data; however, we believe that at
the very top of the income distribution most self-employed individuals provide services to
firms such that they will be covered in our sample. Nonetheless, even for self-employed
individuals with some contracts with firms, we may mismeasure their true income.
From 2005 to 2014, the Social Security data are matched to income from tax data.
These income tax data are valuable because they are not subject to censoring; Social
Security contributions are censored and do not contain some portions of income that are
important for high income tax payers (see Bonhomme and Hospido 2017). Given we will
focus on top income taxpayers it is important we have income data that is not censored
and contains all sources of income. The observational unit of the raw data is based on
each contact an individual had within a given year with Social Security. We define the
main work affiliation in each year as the one which was active for the longest time span
since starting work. We aggregate this data at the individual level to obtain a panel data
set which sums all individual income sources in a given year for a given tax payer.9
We define a change of location if an individual changed his or her residence between
t and t− 1.10 Residence data of the current year is updated using the residence of April
in t+ 1, which ensures that this period overlaps with the tax year as tax declarations are
etc.). However, we do include people moving from those two regions to another region in
Spain as we observe their income in the new destination and know the origin from the
social security database. We furthermore exclude Ceuta and Melilla, two autonomous
cities (not autonomous communities) on continental Africa.
9Only some of the sample are reported as “married” with a substantial fraction declar-
ing “other.” Two individuals may move in our data when they are a common household.
10The transition matrix of movers in are given in appendix A.2.
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due in April to June. As an example, an individual would be characterized as a mover in
2012 if he was living in a different region between April 2012 and April 2013 compared to
his residence between April of 2011 and April 2012. In this way, his 2012 income is the
relevant one for tax purposed in the region he moved to.11 While residence information
is available at much smaller spatial units, in this paper, we will define a “mover” as an
individual that relocates across (not within) regions. One reason for this is that we only
observe municipality codes for individuals living in sufficiently large cities, which means
that many within region moves remain unobserved to us.
We construct taxes using the sum of all reported income by different employers
within each year which is subject to the personal income tax (labor income, reported self-
employed income, and income in-kind). Given this information and other attributes, we
simulate average and marginal tax rates for each individual in each year for each region
using the information in the tax code provided by official documents.12 This simulation
takes into account the variation of marginal tax rates, their brackets, and basic deductions
and tax credits for ascendants, decedents, and disabilities. We do not take into account
any further region specific deductions or tax credits. However, given that we focus on
high income individuals, this would almost never affect the marginal tax rate and the
average tax rate only to a negligible amount as those omitted policies are targeted to low
income individuals. We use the tax calculator to simulate the tax rate in the region of
11Registration is mandatory within three month and municipalities have an incentive
to register citizens because they receive transfers allocated on a per capita base (Foremny,
Jofre-Monseny and Solé-Ollé 2017). An alternative location variable which is available in
this data-set are the region the firm provides when they remit taxes for the individual.
This does not have any legal effect on tax declarations, but rather corresponds to the
address on file with the employer. We observe 57% of movers have firms reporting the
same state from the registrar data. Adding the observations for which the province
declared by a firm coincides with the residential province before moving increases the
share to 96%. This indicates that there is a lag of updating the firm database.
12We use the tax laws to write a tax calculator similar to TAXSIM. See appendix A.3.
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residence and the tax rates in all counterfactual alternative regions.
Summary statistics of our data are given in appendix A.4. Unique to our set-
ting is detailed data on occupation and industry. The appendix also shows descriptives
concerning the top occupations and industries of movers in the top 1%.
3 Aggregate Analysis
For simplicity, consider a two region economy where r = o, d indexes the two regions,
which we call origin and destination for simplicity.13 The utility of top income individuals
living in region r in period t is given by:
Vr,t = αu(cr,t) + πv(gr,t) + µr − γρ(Nr,t) (1)
where cr,t is private consumption of the individual, gr,t is public services consumption, µr
is the value of other amenities that are specific to living in the region. The function ρ
is a disutility that depends on population. The ρ(Nr,t) function allows us to indirectly
bring in housing markets into the problem: a region becomes less attractive, the larger
is its population perhaps because housing prices increase. In particular, fewer people in
a region mean the cost of housing will be lower which raises utility relative to a region
with more people and higher housing costs.14 In particular, this congestion cost it is an
alternative mechanism to get to a spatial equilibrium even without formally modeling
housing price adjustments. Following the standard in the literature, we assume that the
separable functions u, v, and ρ each take on the log functional form.
Each individual supplies a fixed unit of labor so that given the nature of the
problem, an agent consumes all after-tax income: cr,t = (1 − τr,t)wr,t where τr,t is the
13For lack of a better term, we refer to one region d as the destination and the other o
as the origin. Given these are stocks and not flows there is no origin or destination per
se. This verbiage will help us talk about the model without refering to arbitrary regions.
14Suppose both regions were ex ante identical and private and public consumption are
the same in both regions. Then an individual who moves from region o to d will, all else
equal, realize a lower level of utility in region d because after the move Nd,t > No,t.
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tax rate on wages wr,t. In practice, τr,t is not a single rate but rather is the average tax
rate on wages. If the tax system exhibits any progressivity, then τr,t will be a function of
wr,t; thus, a progressive tax system would require estimation to use an average tax rate.
To see this, a progressive tax system would be given by the tax function T (wr,t) and so
consumption would be cr,t = wr,t − T (wr,t) = (1− atrr,t)wr,t.
To close the model, assume production in any given region is given by f(Nr,t) and
satisfies the standard properties fNr,t > 0 and fNr,t < 0; the price of output is normalized
to one Euro. With mobility, the equilibrium in the labor market requires the wage rate
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A locational equilibrium requires for all r = o, d that Vo,t = Vd,t = V . Setting























+ ζd − ζo (2)
where ζo and ζd are defined to include the fixed productive amenities, fixed capital re-
sources and consumption amenities across regions defined above. The above equation
characterizes the equilibrium in the model. Notice that the endogenous adjustment of









, which allows for the
possibility of less than full capitalization of wages. This expression clearly highlights the
role of the congestion cost and the parameter γ.
3.1 Methods
We estimate the pairwise equilibrium condition derived in (2). Denote the net-of-tax rate
with respect to the average tax rate by 1 − atrd,t [1 − atro,t] in the destination [origin]
region. We calculate the average tax rate for a representative taxpayer in the top 1% of











where β captures the effect of taxes on population stocks, which is a function of the
structural parameters in (2).15 As suggested by theory, we include origin fixed effects
that capture amenities (both for households and firms) in the region of origin and des-
tination fixed effects that capture such amenities in the destination region. These fixed
effects also capture any time invariant policies of the regions over our sample. Time
fixed effects are included in the model to capture any aggregate shocks. As suggested
in (2), we control for region-level spending changes across the regions. These spending
controls are designed to capture the effect of any changes in services that may make a
region more attractive following a tax change. In particular, we control for differentials
on basic public services, social protection programs, public programs, general spending,
and transportation infrastructure. In some specifications we include a vector Xdo,t, where
we control for time varying, region-pair specific shocks including economic shocks, demo-
graphic shocks, and regional amenities. These controls help facilitate identification given
that the tax changes are not likely random. Given the set of fixed effects and covariates,
identification requires that, absent tax changes, region-pair stocks are fixed over time.
Notice (2) leads to a structural interpretation of the estimated coefficient in the
locational equilibrium: β is the effect of tax rate changes including their indirect effects
through changes in the regional wages, i.e. the effect taking all fixed regional character-
istics (amenities) and public services as given except for tax rates and wages.16 Given
this interpretation of β, the capitalization into wages does not pose a threat, but other
unobservable wage shocks that are correlated with tax changes would be problematic. To
deal with this, we control for time-varying regional economic conditions in Xdo,t.
Theory implies to estimate the equilibrium condition using the ratios of popula-
tions and taxes rather than the level of the region’s own population. In particular, this
pairwise ratio is useful because we have a small number of regions, which implies the
15There were some very small tax differentials that existed prior to 2011. We set these
differentials to zero prior to 2011. If we include them, the coefficient is almost unchanged.
16If we derived it from a McFadden location choice model without assuming spatial
equilibrium through wages, then, (endogenous) wages would need to be controlled for.
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number of people in a given region depends on the entire vector of net-of-tax rates in all
of the regions. Thus, tax changes in region r′ 6= r will have a non-zero effect on Nr,t. This
is a purpose of estimating the stocks in pairwise ratios. Of course, this pairwise estima-
tion complicates treatment of the standard errors and interpretation of β. We cluster the
standard errors three ways to account for correlation over time within region-pairs and
to account for the correlation of errors within both origin and destination by year pairs.
Estimating the location equilibrium condition in ratios influences the interpreta-
tion of β. Given we allow the tax rate of a given region to influence the population
of other regions, the estimating equation delivers the elasticity of the ratios, Nd,t/No,t.






≡ η − µ (4)
where η is the stock elasticity of the population in region d with respect to its own net-
of-tax rate and µ is the cross-elasticity of region o’s population with respect to region d’s
net-of tax rate. Given η > 0 and µ < 0 are opposite signed, we can conclude that our
estimate of β will over-estimate the elasticity of the stock of a given region. However, as
the number of regions becomes large, then it is likely µ ≈ 0. In our setting, with fifteen
regions, we expect µ to be non-zero, but relatively close to zero and thus β acts as a
reasonable approximation to the stock elasticity. We verify this is true by estimating the
model in levels, which assumes a large number of regions and zero cross-price effects.
Some notes concerning the empirical model are in order. First, in our baseline
specifications, we utilize net-of-average tax rates. To construct the average tax rate,
following Moretti and Wilson (2017), we simulate taxes in all years and regions for a
representative taxpayer in the top 1% holding fixed (across regions and time) income and
any inputs to our tax calculator so that variation in the rate is only due to statutory
changes. As noted above, the use of the average tax rate is theoretically grounded.
However, some of the prior literature has presented results using the top marginal tax
rate (Kleven, Landais and Saez 2013; Akcigit, Baslandze and Stantcheva 2016) as a good
approximation of the average tax rate. We also present results using the top marginal
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tax rate in each region, but note it is not a good approximation to the average tax rate
in our setting. The top marginal tax rate will be correlated with the average tax rate
because regions that raised the top tax rate were also generally regions that raised rates
in lower income brackets (see figure 1). Although our preferred specification uses the
(theoretically grounded) average tax rate, the top marginal tax rate may be salient when
determining the tax liability in alternative regions; although individuals know the average
tax rate in their region, they are unlikely to be able to calculate this across regions.
We estimate a stock model rather than a flow model. First, the stock elasticity is
the parameter of interest in the revenue simulations we will conduct. Second, estimation
in a flow model raises selection concerns because we do not observe migration between
some regions due to our 4% sample and because a flow model would miss international
migration and to the Basque country and Navarre; the stock model will not. Appendix
A.5 discusses additional justification in detail. The stock model avoids all of these is-
sues and in our opinion, provides a more accurate measure of all tax-induced migration.
Limitations of the aggregate analysis resulting from non-random setting of tax rates are
addressed in section 4 where we control for time varying region-specific shocks.
3.2 Results
Given the simple panel data setting, we present our baseline results visually. To do this,
we regress the stock ratio on the fixed effects and controls and then predict the residuals.
We then regress the net of average tax rate variable on the fixed effects and predict the
residuals. We then bin the residuals into equally sized bins and fit a line of best fit through
these data. Figure 2 shows the baseline results; panel A present the results using the
average tax rate while panel B shows the marginal tax rate. We present all results with
and without covariates to see if our identifying assumption is reasonable. Because all tax
variables are in terms of the net-of-tax rate, when individuals keep more on the Euro in
region d relative to region o, they are more likely to move to (or stay in) region d and the
stock increases in d relative to o. As the net-of-tax differential increases, we see that it is
consistent with β > 0. The addition of covariates does not meaningfully change the slope,
but does reduce the noise. The bottom panel shows the regression using the marginal
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tax rate. Although the vertical axis is identical to the upper panel, the horizontal axis is
more disperse because differences in top marginal tax rates are larger than average tax
rates. Thus, the slope of the line of best fit remains positive but is flatter because a one
percent change in the net of (marginal) tax rate will change tax liability less.
We present point estimates of β and standard errors for the aggregate analysis in
table 1. If we assume that the cross-elasticity is small, the specification without controls
suggests the stock elasticity is approximately 0.92. Our estimates of the elasticity are
stable and are not statistically different with or without other covariates. With covariates,
it rises just above unity. This estimate of the elasticity is higher than the estimates in
Moretti and Wilson (2017), who obtain a stock elasticity of 0.45; Akcigit, Baslandze and
Stantcheva (2016) estimate an elasticity of 1 for foreign star scientists. It is larger than
Young et al. (2016) who find very small effects. The elasticity with respect to the top
marginal net-of-tax rate is 0.65, but the average tax rate is the theoretically relevant one.
A concern with this model is that we may overestimate the stock elasticity re-
sulting from migration because of taxable income responses. In particular, we might
worry that in regions lowering their tax rates, taxable income may rise resulting in more
people moving into the top 1% of the income distribution in that region. To address
this concern, we implement several robustness checks. In table 1 we show the results
are robust to controlling for the (endogenous) ratio of taxable income reported by the
top 1% in the region pairs. Second, and more preferably, we also adjust the population
stocks accounting for movement within the income distribution. Let ∆r,t be the number
of people who move in/out of the top percentile of the income distribution in region r.
This number is calculated as the number of people who are in the top 1% this year but
were not in it last year minus the number of people who were in the top 1% last year but
are not this year. Then we calculate an adjusted stock ratio using Ñr,t = Nr,t −∆r,t. We
then run all specifications using ln(Ñd,t/Ño,t) as the dependent variable so that we are
exploiting variation in the stock of people in the top 1% adjusted for any yearly churn
in the income distribution. After doing this, with covariates, we estimate an elasticity of
0.88, which falls slightly suggesting our prior estimates may capture some taxable income
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responses.17 We also estimate a taxable income elasticity directly by regressing the share
of total earned income (working age individuals, excluding pensions and unemployment
benefits) in a region earned by the one percent on the net-of-tax rate, region and year
fixed effects. This regression estimates a small insignificant elasticity suggesting we are
identifying mobility effects in our stock analysis. Appendix A.6 shows the small taxable
income response. This is consistent with Rubolino and Waldenström (2017), which esti-
mates a taxable income elasticity for the top percentile in Spain of 0.05. The results of
these exercises suggest that we are not identifying taxable income responses. However,
to further address this issue, we will subsequently turn to an individual analysis.
We also test for a heterogeneous effect of the tax reform on other lower income
groups. In particular, we consider whether these lower income groups respond to the
average tax rate for top income taxpayers. In figure 3 panel A we present (using the
same scale as the upper panel in the prior figure) results for the top 5% (excluding the
top 1%) and the top 10% to 5% of the income distribution. A mildly positive pattern
emerges in response to the average tax rate differentials for the top 5% and the slope is
declining as income declines. So, what makes lower income households less responsive to
the tax differentials? They have smaller tax rate differentials due to progressivity and
the top 1% average tax rates may not be relevant for them unless they anticipate income
growth, they may care relatively less about tax rates and more about public services
because of non-homothetic preferences, or they may have lower moving probabilities
because of relatively higher moving costs and less job opportunities. Thus, these results
should be interpreted as an analysis of heterogeneity rather than a placebo test given
that the differences along these dimensions cannot be ruled out.
17Assuming the cross-elasticity is small, to interpret the magnitude of the elasticity,
the average region has a stock of 565 taxpayers in the top 1% of the income distribution
(multiplying by 25 yields population estimates). The average net-of-tax rate implies that
a 1% change results in a 0.54 percentage point change. The net-of-tax differential between
regions is on average 1.2 percentage points or over 2 times a 1% change in regional taxes.
This implies a change in the stock of top taxpayers by 11 people.
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We also conduct an exercise in the spirit of a placebo test using the pre-reform
period. To do this, we take our measured tax differentials from 2011-2014 and lag them
into the pre-reform period. We then match these post-reform tax rates to the years prior
to the reform. We show in figure 3 panel B that no significant correlation between the
pre-reform stock ratio changes of the top 1% and post-reform tax rate changes exists.
Given identification is based on a large reform, we wish to show a trend break in
the patterns following the 2011 reform. For each region pair d and o, if the net-of-tax
differential increases in region d relative to region o, we classify that pair as one where the
net-of-tax rate increases. Panel A in figure 4 shows the raw averages of the stock ratio
for pairs where the region d gets to keep more income (taxes fall) relative to region o.
For these observations, the stock ratio increases following the reform and remains higher.










πy1(t− t∗ = y) +
3∑
y=0
βy1(t− t∗ = y)] + ζo + ζd + ζt +Xod,tφ+ εdo,t
(5)
where ln(1−atrd
1−atro ) is the average log differential of the net-of-tax rates in the post-reform
years. Then, 1(t − t∗ = y) are indicator variables relating to the time since the reform
happened in t∗ = 2011. As such, πy show the evolution of the stock ratios prior to the
reform and the βy show the evolution following the reform. Multiplying by ln(
1−atrd
1−atro )
captures the intensity of the treatment and allows us to jointly estimate the effect of
relative increases and decreases in one specification. Panel B of figure 4 shows no clear
pre-trends – if anything, a slight downward trend – but an immediate level increase in
the stock ratio following the reform; given the large jump on impact this may suggest tax
evasion rather than real moves. The regions that lowered rates allowing residents to keep
more, saw an immediate increase in the stock of top income taxpayers. To reduce noise
in the post-reform period, the generalized event study design can also be presented as a
simple dif-in-dif controlling for trends; the results are given in appendix A.6. The event
study is reassuring because population changes do not pre-date the tax reform. Next, we
exploit individual data to control for all time varying regional characteristics and have
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proxies for counterfactual incomes to deal with confounding unobservables.
4 Individual Analysis: Where to Move?
Although the aggregate analysis is appealing in its simplicity, we cannot rule out the
possibility of unobservable time-varying region-specific covariates that are correlated with
taxes and populations, i.e. the tax rates may not be random. To address this concern, we
now use data for an individual tax-payer i who moves in year t. An individual enters the
sample if the individual is in the top 1% in year t and relocates across regions between t
and t − 1 (and only is in the sample in the year of move).18 Subsequently, we will refer
to an individual that moves regions as a “mover”. We denote the alternative residential
options (regions within Spain) as j in our model. In particular, we focus on working-age
movers in our estimating sample from 2006 to 2014; the vast majority of individuals move
only once over the course of our sample but some individuals move multiple times in which
case they appear in our data multiple times. For most individuals there will only be one
time observation (but still J region observations). A “move” is a time-specific move which
is indexed by (i, t) and the choice set for each move is indexed by j. One justification
for focusing on movers is that tax rates are likely a function of all individuals’ location
decisions. Because movers are a relatively small share of the population, it is likely that
the equilibrium tax rates selected following the fiscal decentralization are driven by the
large share of the stayers – reducing endogeneity concerns (Schmidheiny 2006; Brülhart,
Bucovetsky and Schmidheiny 2015). Also, as noted in Schmidheiny (2006), “Households
do not daily decide upon their place of residence. There are specific moments in any
individual’s life when the decision about where to live becomes urgent.... Limiting the
analysis to moving households therefore eliminates the bias when including households
that stay in a per se sub-optimal location because of high monetary and psychological
costs of moving. However, the limitation to moving households introduces a potential
18Moves within a region are not included in our sample; we do not include these moves
because some regions are composed of a small number of provinces and we cannot observe
moves within the same province unless a municipality code is available. We only observe
municipality codes for individuals living in sufficiently large cities.
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selection bias when the unobserved individual factors that trigger the decision to move
are correlated with the unobserved individual taste for certain locations.”
Focusing on movers leaves us with a sample of 893 moves in the top 1%, of which
approximately 330 are in the post-reform period, resulting in 13,395 move-region obser-
vations in our dataset. Note that the aggregate stock analysis allowed “stayers” and
“moving” residents to respond to taxes; in this section we study the effect of taxes condi-
tional on moving regions. In appendix A.7, we also present results for the full sample of
movers and stayers; the appendix also tests for differences in the characteristics of movers
and stayers and finds no significant difference in average incomes prior to the move.
The dependent variable di,t,j is coded one for the chosen region of residence for a
given move (i, t) and zero for all other region that are not selected. In its most complex
form, we estimate the following linear probability model where the person-specific tax
rates from our tax calculator are denoted by τi,t,j:
di,t,j = βln(1− τi,t,j) + αi,t + ιt,j + ζjxi,t + γzi,t,j + εi,t,j. (6)
Because we use moves pre- and post-reform, and because all taxes for a given individual
are the same in the pre-reform period, the pre-reform period helps us to pin down other
explanatory variables.19 Our model contains individual move dummies denoted αi,t, al-
ternative region by year dummies ιt,j, individual characteristics interacted with region
dummies ζjxi,t, and move specific covariates that vary across the choice regions zi,t,j. We
will discuss each of these components in turn.
Move dummies. We estimate our model using a linear model for which we wish
to highlight two important properties. First, predicted choice probabilities over all regions
will add up to 1 for an individual i moving in year t. Second, an increase in the tax rate
in one region does theoretically increase the probability of choosing this region while it
decreases the probability of choosing any other region. Along both of these points, the
19In all that follows, the very small tax differentials in the pre-reform period are not
utilized. Including these differentials in the regression yields almost identical results.
21
presence of αi,t for each move is critical because it forces the predicted probabilities to sum
to one and therefore an increase in one region will lower the probability of the alternative
regions; this fixed effect adjusts the predicted probability from all other covariates by
capturing the average deviation from the average probability.20 However, the predicted
probability of a mover selecting any one region need not be bounded between zero and
one; even with this, the predicted probabilities across the choice regions will sum to one.
The inclusion of αi,t also forces identification of our parameter of interest to come from
variation in tax rates across regions for a given move. In this way, we exploit the income
tax differential across regions for a given tax payer which relocated. In the subsequent
paragraphs, we discuss each of the components of this regression.21
Taxes. The theoretically appropriate tax rate, the “true-ATR”, would be the
actual effective average tax rate facing a given individual in a given region, which is a
function of the individual’s (possibly counterfactual) income in that region and the tax
system in that region. Because this counterfactual is not observable to us, we use a
“simulated-ATR” measure, which is the average tax rate for a given income level in a
given region; this simulated tax rate is a function of the (assumed to be constant) income
level across regions and the tax schedule in that region. In the baseline specification, the
20For ease of notation, we prove this for a single covariate denoted by xi,t,j. The sum
of the predicted probabilities for a move (i, t) is given by
∑
j(β̂xi,t,j + α̂i,t) = β̂ · J · xi,t +
J · α̂i,t = J · [β̂xi,t + α̂i,t] where the bar denotes an average over the j’s. Given we have
J alternatives and only one region can be chosen: di,t =
1
J
. The linear model implies
that the estimated fixed effects, α̂i,t, are given by α̂i,t = di,t − β̂xi,t ⇒ di,t = β̂xi,t + α̂i,t.




j(β̂xi,t,j + α̂i,t) = J · di,t = J ·
1
J
= 1. This, then, implies that an increase in the
probability of selecting one region must lower the probability of the alternative regions.
21The linear model assumes that the effects are constant. Very small regions with very
low baseline probabilities, will experience the same effect in percentage points as large
regions with high baseline probabilities. The inclusion of region by year fixed effects
controls for characteristics like jurisdiction size that influence the baseline probabilities.
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simulated net-of-tax rate is person-specific (not for a representative taxpayer). Specifi-
cally, because counterfactual wages are not observed to us, we use our tax calculator to
construct the individual’s average tax rate by assuming her income is constant across
the regions. However, in practice and as shown by our theory which allows for wage
capitalization to arise in spatial equilibrium (recall (2)), income may differ across the re-
gions. In particular, a given individual is more likely to move to a high-income region all
else equal. Given that taxes are progressive, by assuming that income is constant we will
overestimate counterfactual wages (because we observe them in the selected, likely higher
wage, region) and therefore overestimate counterfactual tax rates. This raises measure-
ment error concerns, because the average simulated tax rates depend on the assumed to
be constant income across regions and not the true counterfactual wages that may differ
across regions. However, as noted in Kleven, Landais and Saez (2013), the (individual’s)
marginal tax rate, the tax rate facing a given individual in a given region, proxies for the
exogenous component of the ATR because it is independent of earnings and allows us
to implement an IV strategy discussed below.22 This also has the advantage of reducing
measurement error in the average tax rate that might result from elements of the tax
code not captured by our tax calculator. The variation in the marginal tax rate, across
regions for the top 1% relative to other income groups is verified by looking at the within
mover variation in appendix A.7. The variation across different regions a taxpayer could
choose increases substantially from 2011 onward, and is more pronounced for the top 1%.
Wage controls and sorting. Equilibrium wage differentials across regions may
also be important to the choice of region. Although we assume wages are equal across
regions to calculate taxes, wages may differ across regions and influence migration deci-
sions irrespective of taxes. To control for unobservable counterfactual wages, we include
location specific dummies interacted with characteristics of the mover (age, age squared,
male, and education). Denote the vector of characteristics interacted with region specific
22We cannot use the top marginal tax rate as an approximation for ATR because most
individuals do not have income well into the top bracket. Thus, we use the mover’s
marginal tax rate based on the bracket for her income as an instrument.
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dummies ζjxi,t. This allows the returns to education and the skill premium to vary by
region; by allowing observables to vary by region, these observable characteristics are
used to account for unobservable counterfactual wages. Although motivated by wage
differentials, this parameterization also can be interpreted as capturing any sorting of
specific types of individuals to particular regions. For example, if high-educated or older
individuals have preferences for locating in a region, the specification will capture this.
Public services and regional shocks. Public services across regions matter.
The inclusion of region by year dummies (ιj,t) captures any time varying policies – such
as changes in public services – that are constant across all individuals in the top 1%.23
In general, however, we note that tax increases on the rich are not likely to change public
services for the rich as these taxpayers are net payers into the tax system. Thus, in
addition to accounting for regional policies, ιj,t also account for time-varying amenities or
economic shocks in the alternative regions that affect individuals in the top 1%. Unlike in
the aggregate analysis, inclusion of these dummies is possible because we exploit mover-
specific income to calculate tax rates rather than income for a representative taxpayer.
Other controls. Finally, moving costs between regions, which could be thought
of as higher γ in our theory, also matter. To capture these moving costs, we include in
a vector zi,t,j a dummy variable that equals one if the region is the place of birth for the
individual. We also include a dummy variable for the region of the principle workplace
of the individual and a dummy variable that equals one if the individual had their first
job in that region. Following a standard gravity model of migration, we also include the
log of distance between the region of prior residence and each of the alternative regions.
This captures the fact that nearby regions have lower moving costs because they allow
individuals to maintain their social and family network. Acknowledging the region of
residence prior to moving plays a special role as it cannot be selected by a mover, we also
include a dummy variable that equals one if the individual previously lived in the region.
Note that these covariates can enter the regression even though they are time-invariant
23These also capture the possible effect of wealth taxes across regions and time.
24
because they vary over the alternative j regions for a given individual i in year t.24
One important issues is the treatment of standard errors in this model. In par-
ticular, the dummy variables in (6) are related over the different regions j as only one
option can be chosen for a given move. Further, tax policy is set by the region. First, we
cluster over moves to resolve the first issue. Second, we cluster over destination region
by year clusters to account for tax law in a region influencing all movers. In particular,
it allows for correlation in errors across all movers for a particular region-year that may
result, perhaps, from the common elements of the tax code that affect all individuals.
We show the results for other treatments of standard errors (see appendix A.7).
Two additional selection issues arise. In terms of identification, selection concerns
may arise because the sample excludes two Spanish regions because they operate au-
tonomous fiscal systems; we treat these two regions as being “international” so that any
concerns about moves to these regions are similar to concerns about moves abroad (these
two regions also have their own languages, so moving to these regions may involve similar
costs of moving abroad). This issue is common to prior studies of domestic migration
that do not observe migration abroad. An additional concern arises because individuals
appear in our estimating sample only when they move and thus the time dimension is
unbalanced. If someone exits the top 1% and then moves, they would not appear in our
sample. This type of exit from the sample would only be a concern if the individual
exits the top 1% for reasons due to the income tax. In particular, this would result in us
overestimating [underestimating] our effects if an individual that reduced their taxable
income (enough to drop out of our sample) was also an individual that then elected to stay
or move to a high-tax [low-tax] region. However, as discussed in the aggregate analysis,
appendix A.6 shows the taxable income response following the reform was small.
4.1 Baseline Results
Table 2 shows estimation of (6) using the average tax rate for each individual. Column
(1) shows the results including αi,t fixed effects and region by year fixed effects. The
coefficient, 0.588, is the expected sign: a higher net-of-tax rate implies a higher probability
24For example, the place of birth dummy is one in the region of birth and zero in others.
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of migrating to that region because the individual can keep more of what is earned. In
terms of the magnitude, this coefficient implies that a one percent increase in the net-of-
tax rate raises the probability of choosing a given destination by 0.59 percentage points.
This represents a substantial increase in the probability of moving to a region, which if
random would be 1/15. Subsequent columns of the table add various controls discussed
above. This helps with the precision of our estimates, but the coefficient on the net-of-tax
rate are stable – if anything, slightly increasing after accounting for these controls. Given
that these variables richly control for counterfactual wage differences across regions and
any possible sorting, this is very reassuring. Critical to our analysis is that column (2)
containing no wage controls and column (7) containing a complete set of wage controls
(xi,t × ιj) are not statistically different. The covariate adjusted coefficient is 0.90.25
We focused on the sample of movers across regions where the role of taxes is salient.
We estimate a model using both stayers and movers in the top 1% and find a smaller
coefficient of 0.08. This is consistent with Akcigit, Baslandze and Stantcheva (2016) who
estimate elasticities of domestic scientists around 0.03, but near 1 for foreigners.
4.2 IV Approach
Kleven, Landais and Saez (2013) adopt a grouping estimator a to construct the average
tax rate by year × country × foreign × quality. In their specification, quality serves
a similar role as the, assumed to be constant, income level in our tax simulator. But,
in our setting, by assuming that income is constant we may overestimate counterfactual
wages (because we use income from the selected, likely higher wage region) and therefore
overestimate counterfactual tax rates. This raises measurement error concerns because
the simulated-ATR is a noisy measure of true-ATR in the non-chosen regions. To resolve
this issue, we instrument for the average tax rate with the mover-specific marginal tax
rate, which is independent of earnings conditional on being in the same tax bracket. Given
most individuals in the top 1% only have a fraction of income taxed at their marginal
tax rate, the relationship with the average rate is not as close to one as for superstars.
For this reason, the MTR cannot simply be used as a proxy for the true-ATR.
25Appendix A.8 shows that our results are robust to using a nonlinear model.
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Table 3 shows results using this IV strategy (appendix A.7 shows the reduced
form with the marginal rate). As expected, the IV reduces attenuation bias concerns;
the results are larger in magnitude. The first stage coefficient is the expected sign, and
is less than one given that a one point increase in the marginal rate raises the average
rate by less than one point. The instrument is strong given changes in marginal rates
at the top of the distribution are generally correlated with the pattern of changes lower
in the income distribution. After instrumenting, a one percent increase in the net-of-tax
rate increases the probability of moving to a region by 1.452 percentage points in our
baseline specification and 1.731 percentage points in our most comprehensive estimating
equation. The intuition is clear: absent an instrument our tax sensitivity is estimated off
of simulated net-of-tax differentials that are noisy measures of the counterfactual tax rate
because we assumed that income is constant across regions, which due to attenuation bias
results in underestimating the true coefficient of interest. Our instrument resolves this
issue. These estimates suggest that the 0.75 percentage point differential in the average
tax rate at mean income between Madrid and Cataluña in 2013 increases the probability
of moving to Madrid by 2.25 percentage points. The effect of Madrid’s 2014 tax cut of
0.38 percentage points further increases the probability of moving to Madrid by another
1.14 percentage points. Effects are likely larger at higher income levels in the top 1%
because the average tax rate differential at 300,000 Euros is over two percentage points.
We also estimate our model using the top 2% and top 3% of taxpayers. The effects
fall off substantially and become insignificant after the top 1% of the income distribution.
This may be due to the variation in tax rates in figure 1, which shows the divergence
of tax rates is strongest – and most likely to overcome migration costs – for the top
1%. The divergence of tax rates across regions is not large outside of the top 1% and
thus these “lower” income individuals are not much influenced by the reform unless they
expect to see large income increases in the future. To formally test if the semi-elasticity
varied across the income distribution (Lehmann, Simula and Trannoy 2014), we would
need equally salient tax changes for lower income groups exceeding their moving costs.
With respect to our instrument, the marginal tax rate may not be independent
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of earnings if individuals change brackets. Thus, the best instrument would account for
the individual being in the same tax bracket for all regions. To analyze the importance
of this, we remove any individuals from the analysis that are within χ% above or below
all tax bracket thresholds for all regions. We show results for χ = {1, 2.5, 5}. Thus,
for χ = 1, we remove anyone who is 3,000 Euro above or below the top tax bracket of
300,000 Euro, 1,750 Euro above or below the 175,000 Euro threshold, etc. Appendix A.7
shows that for χ = 1 or χ = 2.5, the results remain similar: a one percent change in
the net-of-tax rate changes the probability of moving to a given region by approximately
1.8 percentage points. For χ = 5, the results increase because the large cutoff removes a
substantial fraction of “lower” income individual in the top percentile.
Given the IV only resolves measurement error concerns relating to counterfactual
wages, one concern may be that the variation in tax rates across regions is not random.
We conduct an exercise in the spirit of a placebo test to verify that post-reform tax
rates are not correlated with unobservable characteristics that predict migration. We use
the post-reform data to construct a placebo measure of tax rates in the pre-period. To
do this, for each individual i and region alternative j in the Social Security data, we
construct the mean tax rate in the post reform data (2011 to 2014). We use this tax rate
as an explanatory variable to explain pre-reform moves to see if these post-reform tax
rate differentials have any effect on the decisions pre-reform.
In table 4 column (3), we first show results using post-reform migration to show
that taking the mean tax rate for each individual yields a very similar coefficient (2.05
versus 1.73 previously). In column (4), we restrict the sample to individuals that moved in
the pre-reform period between 2005 and 2010 and implement the IV approach for these
individuals using the placebo tax rates. The coefficient falls to 0.09. Post-reform tax
rates are not correlated with unobservable factors that may have influenced pre-reform
migration. This suggests to us the post-reform tax rates were not set in a way that was
correlated with the observable migration patterns in the pre-reform period.
4.3 Heterogeneity
Although we have identified significant location choice effects, we have yet to determine if
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the location choices reflect real moves or simply tax evasion by misreporting the primary
residence (perhaps to a second home). In order to shed light on this, we explore whether
the tax changes have heterogeneous effects across different types of people by interacting
the tax rates with indicator variables for various groups. Appendix A.7 presents the
results by age, whether the individual has children, gender and education.
In general, we do not find statistically significant differences across groups. This
could be a result of characteristics not affecting the probability of where to move, but
rather the ability to move per se. However, characteristics may also matter for where
to move. One category that does have economically meaningful differences in the point
estimates relates to education status; individuals with a higher education have a stronger
influence of taxes on their location choices. This is consistent with these higher educated
individuals having less job constraints and thus having a larger feasible set of regions to
choose from. High educated households might also be more likely to seek the advice of a
investment or tax consultant that might give advice on low-tax residential location.
In appendix A.7 we show results by job characteristics.We wish to see if the indi-
vidual moves are driven by employment shocks or changes in the locations of firms. We
focus on individuals that had a “non-voluntary stop” of their main contract in the previ-
ous year or in the year of the move, individuals where the headquarter of the firm of their
main contract moved, and individuals that changed their contract. We find similar point
estimates across all of the categories, however, one category is usually insignificant. Given
that the estimates are not statistically different from each other, we conclude that the
increases in the probability of moving to a region are not driven by firm-side responses.
4.4 Occupation and Industry
With the exception of Young et al. (2016), who focus on millionaires, the prior literature
has been unable to answer the question whether policymakers can take the estimates
derived for star scientists and athletes and apply these elasticities to the top of the
income distribution more generally. The Spanish data we have access to is unique in that
occupation and industry are reported in the data; this is not information that would be
easily available when using U.S. tax return data. We test the generalizability of focusing
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on star scientists and athletes using these data. Although the number of athletes and
star scientists are too small to focus on these groups specifically (tables A.19 and A.18),
we can aggregate to broader occupation/industry categories that allow us to study the
heterogeneity. This section helps to inform the recent policy debate on the efficiency of tax
schemes for top earners in specific occupations. Several OECD countries have preferential
tax schemes for foreigners in high-income occupations. By focusing on heterogeneity by
occupation and industry, we can shed light on the efficiency of these schemes.
To determine if some industries or occupations are more responsive, we estimate
(6) with an interaction of ln(1− τi,t,j) with dummy variables for occupation or industry
categories. We show the results in figure 5 with precise point estimates in appendix
A.9. When looking at the result for occupation, we identify the strongest effect for self-
employed occupations; they are twice as large as all other occupations.26 This is consistent
with these individuals being able to change their residence because their work location
may also be flexible. Most of the other three broad categories have smaller degrees of
responsiveness to each other. Although we have grouped the occupations based on skill,
the occupation categories do not follow a natural hierarchy. Thus, we switch to industry
classifications, where we use the one digit industry groupings in the data.
Figure 5 shows substantial heterogeneity by industry. We find the largest (and
statistically significant) effects in the health, real estate, information, financial, and pro-
fessional/scientific industries. Even within these groups, the effects in the health industry
are three times larger than the financial industry. This heterogeneity may result, for ex-
ample, from lower moving costs because of ease in relocating jobs. To compare this to
the prior literature, athletes would fall under the category of arts and entertainment,
while scientists could be under health or professional/scientific, which exhibit a very high
degree of tax-induced mobility to lower tax regions. Our general takeaway from these
results is that the responsiveness to taxes varies substantially depending on occupation
26This result should be interpreted with the caveats discussed previously. Self employed
are only included if they have a relationship with a registered firm. We verify in appendix
A.9 that the self-employed have a majority of their income from non-labor income.
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and industry. Thus, these results provide a cautionary tale; the prior literature focusing
on star scientists and athletes may not generalize to other occupations/industries.
5 Interpretation and Revenue Implications
An important policy question is how this reform affects tax revenue. For simplicity,
consider a nonlinear tax schedule T (yi) where individual i earns income yi, which is
endogenous to the tax system because of taxable income responses. To proceed, assume
that the top tax rate above the income bracket y is linear and given by τ . Define N , which
is a function of taxes because of potential migration responses, as the stock of individuals
above y. To characterize the revenue maximizing top tax rate, follow the approach of
Piketty and Saez (2013), maintaining all of their assumptions. Holding fixed taxes below
y and perturbing τ by dτ and aggregating across individuals – letting y denote the average
income in the top bracket – yields the total effect of top tax rate changes on revenue.
The tax change will have three effects: a mechanical effect as a result of the change in
the tax rate, an effect resulting from migration, and taxable income responses. Totally
differentiating tax revenue, the change in tax revenue R can be decomposed into:

















where η = dN
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d(1−τ) is the elasticity of taxable income and a =
y
y−ȳ is the Pareto parameter.
This is a partial equilibrium analysis: it abstracts from spillovers from the presence of
top earners to the income of, and thus revenues from, lower taxpayers; it ignores any other
revenue effects obtained through other taxing instruments; and it assumes no horizontal
or vertical fiscal externalities. One important limitation is that the elasticity of taxable
income is calibrated rather than estimated. Setting (7) to zero and solving for ε, we can














We estimate the revenue effects holding fixed the central government’s tax rate at
its 2014 level. We ask the question: at 2014 regional tax rates, how much does revenue
change relative to if the region had simply mimicked the central government’s tax rate
on its tax base in 2014? Thus, for regions that raised their tax rate relative to the central
government’s tax rates, the mechanical effect is positive, but both the taxable income and
mobility effect will be negative. For regions that decreased their tax rates relative to the
central government tax rate, the effects will be opposite in sign. The Pareto parameter
is estimated using income data and the mobility elasticity using aggregate analysis. We
estimate confidence bands using the parametric bootstrap. We assume the ETI is 0.15,
which is slightly lower than the mid-point in the literature because the part of the tax base
we analyze excludes capital income. Appendix A.10 details the simulation assumptions.
Figure 6 panel A shows the change in revenue resulting from the regional tax rates
as a percent of total personal income tax revenue from all residents. The precise revenue
effects with confidence bands are given in appendix A.10. The figure shows that in all
circumstances, the mechanical effect of higher or lower tax rates is always the same sign
as the total effect on tax revenue after accounting for all behavioral effects. This means
that governments are on the left side of the Laffer curve: raising tax rates relative to the
central government rate increases tax revenue in the regions. Madrid lowering its tax rate
relative to the central tax rate corresponds to a decline in tax revenue from the top 1%.
This lower tax rate results in revenue falling by 50 million Euro. However, taxable income
only rises by 4 million Euro and the additional new high taxpayers contribute 9 million
Euro more. Thus, the behavioral effect from migration is only 18% of the mechanical
effect. The total change in revenue from the reform lowers tax revenue by approximately
0.42 percent of total personal income tax revenues in the region of Madrid. Although
the stock elasticity is “large,” if taxable income responses are small, progressive taxation
remains a feasible means of raising revenue in the short-run. Of course, the calculation
of the revenue effects has all the partial equilibrium caveats discussed above.
One limitation of this is that the elasticity of taxable income is calibrated rather
than estimated. Figure 6 panel B shows the value of the ETI that is necessary for the
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region’s deviation from the national tax rate to result in the taxable income and mobility
response exactly offsetting the mechanical effect. The figure indicates that this ETI must
be between 1.02 and 1.34. These values are well outside the range of the best available
estimates of this elasticity, which range from 0.12 to 0.40 (Saez, Slemrod and Giertz
2012), and suggest that our revenue conclusions are not driven by the calibration.
6 Conclusion
We find that income tax changes result in a stock elasticity less than unity. In revenue
terms, the behavioral effects induced by tax rate changes have a smaller effect on tax
revenue than the mechanical effect resulting from a higher or lower tax rate. Although
the migration response is significant, the taxable income responses are likely small mean-
ing that the elasticity of the tax base is well below unit elastic. Although the recent
economics literature has seen an increase in research on migration, we are the first study
to use population-representative administrative data in a country where taxes are purely
residence based. Our revenue simulations suggest that changes in the stock of top tax-
payers has minimal tax base effects. Thus, our results, at least in the short run, are
consistent with Epple and Romer (1991) who show that local redistribution is feasible
with migration, but in contradiction to Feldstein and Wrobel (1998) who show the oppo-
site. In the long run, mobility is likely to rise given demographic shifts and technological
innovations, which may impose added constraints on redistributive policy.
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ing Notches to Identify Manipulation of Population-based Grants.” Journal of Public
Economics 154:49–66.
Kleven, Henrik J., Camille Landais, Emmanuel Saez and Esben A. Schultz. 2014. “Mi-
gration, and Wage Effects of Taxing Top Earners: Evidence from the Foreigners’ Tax
Scheme in Denmark.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 129:333–378.
Kleven, Henrik Jacobsen, Camille Landais and Emmanuel Saez. 2013. “Taxation and
International Migration of Superstars: Evidence from the European Football Market.”
American Economic Review 103(5):1892–1924.
Lehmann, Etienne, Laurent Simula and Alain Trannoy. 2014. “Tax Me If You Can!
Optimal Nonlinear Income Tax Between Competing Governments.” Quarterly Journal
of Economics 129(4):1995–2030.
34
Mart́ınez, Isabel Z. 2016. “Beggar-Thy-Neighbour Tax Cuts: Mobility after a Local
Income and Wealth Tax Reform in Switzerland.” Working Paper.
Milligan, Kevin and Michael Smart. 2016. “An Estimable Model of Income Redistribution
in a Federation: Musgrave Meets Oates.” UBC Working Paper.
Mirrlees, James A. 1982. “Migration and Optimal Income Taxes.” Journal of Public
Economics 18(3):319–341.
Moretti, Enrico and Daniel Wilson. 2017. “The Effect of State Taxes on the Geographical
Location of Top Earners: Evidence from Star Scientists.” American Economic Review
107(7):1859–1903.
Piketty, Thomas and Emmanuel Saez. 2013. “Optimal Labor Income Taxation.” Hand-
book of Public Economics 5:391–474.
Rubolino, Enrico and Daniel Waldenström. 2017. “Trends and Gradients in Top Tax
Elasticities: Cross-country Evidence, 1900-2014.” CEPR Discussion Paper 11935.
Saez, Emmanuel, Joel Slemrod and Seth H. Giertz. 2012. “The Elasticity of Taxable
Income with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review.” Journal of Economic
Literature 50(1):3–50.
Schmidheiny, Kurt. 2006. “Income Segregation and Local Progressive Taxation: Empiri-
cal Evidence from Switzerland.” Journal of Public Economics 90:429–458.
Schmidheiny, Kurt and Michaela Slotwinski. 2018. “Behavioral Responses to Local Tax
Rates: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from a Foreigners’ Tax Scheme in Switzerland.”
Journal of Public Economics .
Wildasin, David E. 2006. “Global Competition for Mobile Resources: Implications for
Equity, Efficiency, and Political Economy.” CESifo Economic Studies 52(1):61–110.
Wildasin, David E. 2009. Public Finance in an Era of Global Demographic Change:
Fertility Busts, Migration Booms, and Public Policy. In Skilled Immigration Today:
Prospects, Problems, and Policies, ed. Jagdish Bhagwati and Gordon Hanson.
Young, Cristobal and Charles Varner. 2011. “Millionaire Migration and State Taxation of
Top Incomes: Evidence from a Natural Experiment.” National Tax Journal 64:255–284.
Young, Cristobal, Charles Varner, Ithai Lurie and Rich Prisinzano. 2016. “Millionaire
35
Migration and the Demography of the Elite: Implications for American Tax Policy.”
American Sociological Review 81(3):421–446.
36



























0 100 200 300
income in thousands of Euros
AND ARA AST BAL
CAN CNT CAL CAM





























0 100 200 300
income in thousands of Euros
2014
The graph shows the deviation in the marginal tax rates for each region relative to what
the tax rate would be if the region just copied the central government’s tax rate in that
same year. The first figure shows the deviations in 2011 immediately following the reform
and the second figure shows the deviations in 2014. The vertical line shows the income
cutoff for the top 1% in each year.
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Figure 2: Effect of Taxes on the Stock Ratio
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MTR regression with controls
Panel A shows a visual representation of the regression of the stock ratios on the net-of-
average-tax differentials, while panel B presents the regression of the stock ratios on the
net-of-marginal-tax differentials. The left figure of each panel excludes controls while the
right figure of each panel includes controls in these regressions. To construct the figures,
we regress the log of the stock ratio in region d (called “destination” for convenience)
relative to region o (called “origin” for convenience) on the fixed effects, government
spending controls, and controls to obtain the residuals. The tax variable is residualized
in a similar manner. The figure plots the residuals in equal sized bins and shows the line
of best fit. The provides both a non-parametric and linear estimate of the conditional
expectation function. The theoretically expected effect is positive as keeping more money
in the destination state means tax rates are lower, which implies more migration to the
destination, increasing the stock.
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Figure 3: Heterogeneity Using Lower Income Groups and Placebo Test
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pre-reform test
The figures in panel A are comparable to the covariate adjusted ATR results of figure 2
except they focus on lower percentiles of the income distribution. To remain comparable,
we use the net-of-average-tax variable for the top 1% to explain these lower-income stock
ratios. The only difference from the prior figure is that we use the stock ratios of individ-
uals outside the top one percent (the top 5% excluding the top 1% and the top 10% to
5%). Panel B is comparable to the covariate adjusted ATR results of figure 2 except for
the use of only pre-reform moves and the time lag of tax rates. We take post-reform tax
rates and lag them into the pre-reform period to see if they predict pre-reform population
stocks. In panel B, the theoretically expected effect is zero given this is a placebo test.
All figures use the same vertical/horizontal scale as panel A in figure 2.
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Figure 4: Event Study of Stock Ratio Using the 2011 Reform
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formal event study coefficients
Panel A shows the raw averages of the stock ratios in region pairs where the net-of-tax
rate increases in region d relative to region o following the reform. The stock ratio is the
population in the top 1% of region d relative to region o. Panel B presents a formal event
study where each year indicator is scaled by the average tax differential in the post-reform
period between the region pair. Thus, the vertical axis can be interpreted as the effect on
the stock ratio of a one percent increase in the net-of-tax rate in the destination region
relative to the origin region. We plot 90% confidence bands.
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effects by industry
This figure shows the effects by occupation and industry with 90% confidence inter-
vals around the point estimates. In Panel A, we show the effects by occupation (sorted
by significance and then magnitude). Self-employed are those individuals that have their
longest contract with a registered firm. The “other” category includes all occupations not
in the previous three groups; these occupations include non-graduate assistants, admin-
istrative officers, subordinates, administrative assistants, first and second class officers,
third class officers and technicians, and labourers. In the Panel B, we show the effects by
industries. Detailed industry descriptions are in the appendix.
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Figure 6: Revenue Effects and ETI Simulations
Panel A: Revenue Effects









































































































Panel A of the figure shows the breakdown of changes in revenue, as a percent of total
personal income tax revenue raised. We show the effect of the region’s post-reform tax
change relative to if the region had followed the central government tax rate. Thus, when
the mechanical effect is negative this corresponds to the region lowering its tax rate; if it
is positive, it corresponds to the region raising its tax rate. We focus on tax changes on
incomes above 90,000 Euros with an ETI of 0.15. We estimate the Pareto parameter and
the mobility effect is taken from our estimate of the stock elasticity. In panel B, the bars
show the critical elasticity of taxable income for which the regional deviations from the
central government tax schedule would have resulted in the region observing no change in
revenue. We obtain confidence intervals using the parametric bootstrap. Valencia simply
mimicked the central government and therefore is not included.
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Table 1: Aggregate Analysis: Effect on Stock Ratios
Average Tax Rate Marginal Tax Rate




0.917* 1.116** 1.129** 0.878* 0.652** 0.656** 0.669** 0.556**
(0.537) (0.545) (0.549) (0.500) (0.288) (0.300) (0.303) (0.267)
origin FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
destination
FE
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
govn’t
spending
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
controls N Y Y Y N Y Y Y
specification income churn income churn
observations 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050
The dependent variable is the log of the stock ratio, which is the number of individuals
in the top 1% in region d relative to region o. The log of net-of-average-tax rate
differential is the ratio of the net-of-tax rate in region d relative to region o and uses the
average tax rate in the first four columns and marginal tax rate in the last four columns.
Controls include demographic, economic, and amenity variables. The expected sign is
positive. The last two columns in each set address potential taxable income responses
by controlling for the income ratio in the top 1% or by adjusting the stock for the
number of people that transition in/out of the top 1% relative to the prior year. The
estimates represent the elasticity of the ratio. Standard errors allow for three-way
clustering (region pair, origin-year, destination year). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2: Individual Analysis: Average Tax Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ln(1− atri,t,j)
0.588 0.714** 0.894*** 0.712** 0.767** 0.714** 0.904***
(0.420) (0.343) (0.336) (0.337) (0.336) (0.343) (0.332)
place of
origin
-0.797*** -0.765*** -0.797*** -0.796*** -0.796*** -0.766***
(0.061) (0.060) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.060)
place of birth
0.207*** 0.206*** 0.207*** 0.207*** 0.207*** 0.206***
(0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021)
place of first
work
0.185*** 0.177*** 0.186*** 0.186*** 0.185*** 0.177***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020)
work place
0.288*** 0.261*** 0.288*** 0.287*** 0.287*** 0.261***
(0.018) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.021)
ln(distance)
-0.075*** -0.072*** -0.075*** -0.075*** -0.075*** -0.072***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
move FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
j by year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
j by edu N N Y N N N Y
j by age N N N Y Y N Y
j by age2 N N N N Y N Y
j by male N N N N N Y Y
controls N Y Y Y Y Y Y
observations 13,395 13,395 13,395 13,395 13,395 13,395 13,395
moves 893 893 893 893 893 893 893
R2 0.122 0.278 0.302 0.279 0.280 0.279 0.304
In all specifications, the estimating sample uses pre- and post-reform moves in the top 1%
of the income distribution. Each move has fifteen observations: one for each possible
alternative region. The dependent variable equals one if the region is selected. This table
uses the person-specific net-of-average-tax rate as the independent variable. All standard
errors are clustered two-ways: region-year clusters and move (i, t) clusters. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3: Individual Analysis: Average Tax Rates with IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ln(1− atri,t,j)
1.452 1.542* 1.711** 1.510* 1.614** 1.534* 1.731**
(0.948) (0.788) (0.791) (0.789) (0.792) (0.787) (0.797)
place of
origin
-0.797*** -0.766*** -0.797*** -0.796*** -0.797*** -0.766***
(0.061) (0.060) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.060)
place of birth
0.207*** 0.206*** 0.207*** 0.207*** 0.207*** 0.206***
(0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021)
place of first
work
0.185*** 0.177*** 0.186*** 0.186*** 0.185*** 0.177***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020)
work place
0.288*** 0.261*** 0.288*** 0.287*** 0.287*** 0.261***
(0.018) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.021)
ln(distance)
-0.075*** -0.072*** -0.075*** -0.075*** -0.075*** -0.072***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
move FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
j by year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
j by edu N N Y N N N Y
j by age N N N Y Y N Y
j by age2 N N N N Y N Y
j by male N N N N N Y Y
controls N Y Y Y Y Y Y
observations 13,395 13,395 13,395 13,395 13,395 13,395 13,395
moves 893 893 893 893 893 893 893
R2 0.122 0.278 0.302 0.279 0.280 0.278 0.304
first stage
coefficient
0.392*** 0.392*** 0.392*** 0.392*** 0.391*** 0.392*** 0.391***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
F-statistic 735.1 740.2 745.6 740.2 795.6 740.9 792.9
This table uses the person-specific net-of-average-tax rate and instruments for it with the
person-specific net-of-marginal-tax rate. The bottom panel shows the first stage. We
present the F-statistic for instrument strength. The treatment of standard errors, the
estimating sample and variables are as defined in Table 2. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4: Placebo Test
(1) (2) (3) (4)










1.273*** 0.286 2.051*** 0.093
(0.414) (0.356) (0.687) (0.469)
move dummies Y Y Y Y
j by year dummies Y Y Y Y
ζjxi,t Y Y Y Y
controls: zi,t,j Y Y Y Y
observations 4,965 6,180 4,965 6,180
number of moves 331 412 331 412
F-statistic 797.9 509.1
This table shows results of a placebo test verifying that post-reform tax rates
have no significant effect on pre-reform migration patterns. The post-reform
sample is restricted to migrants in the post-reform period, while the
pre-reform sample is restricted to individuals moving in the pre-reform
period. To do this, we construct the mean tax rate for each alternative and
individual in the post-reform period 2011-2014. Columns (1) and (3) show
that even using this mean tax rate, rather than year specific rates, we can
obtain similar results as in table 2 and 3. Columns (2) and (4) then use
migration decisions in the period 2005-2010, but using the mean tax rates
constructed from the period 2011-2014. Column (1) and (2) use the
net-of-average-tax rate. Column (3) and (4) use the net-of-average-tax rate
and instruments for it using the net-of-marginal-tax rate. All standard errors
are clustered two-ways: region-year clusters and move (i, t) clusters. We
present the F-statistic as a test of instrument strength. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
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